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“Absolutely Incapable of 
‘Carrying On’”
Shell Shock, Suicide, and the Death of 
Lieutenant Colonel Sam Sharpe 
 
M A t t h e w  b A r r e t t
Abstract : This article examines Canadian social and medical 
responses to nervous breakdown and suicide in the First World War 
through the case study of Lieutenant Colonel Sam Sharpe, a Member 
of Parliament and commander of the 116th Battalion. An historical 
analysis of Sharpe’s experiences and reaction to war trauma provides 
wider insights into how shell shock and military suicide represented 
a potential threat to prewar masculine ideals. Medical and political 
interpretations of Sharpe’s breakdown initially aimed to preserve 
social stability and validate the war’s moral justifications but 
contradictory understandings of shell shock ultimately made for a 
complicated and unstable process of commemoration.
But it is awful to contemplate the misery and suffering in this old world 
[and] were I to allow myself to ponder over what I have seen [and] what 
I have suffered thro [sic] the loss of the bravest [and] best in the world, 
I would soon become absolutely incapable of “Carrying on.”1 
Lieutenant CoLoneL Sam Sharpe, a sitting Member of Parliament and commander of the 116th Battalion, wrote the 
above message to Muriel Hutchison, the widow of one of his officers, 
1  Sam Sharpe to Muriel Hutchison, 21 October 1917. Letter courtesy of the Ontario 
Regiment Museum (Oshawa, Ontario).
© Canadian Military History 2016
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2 Absolutely Incapable of ‘Carrying On’
on 21 October 1917 just prior to the battle of Passchendaele. Seven 
months later Sharpe jumped to his death from a Montreal hospital 
window on 25 May 1918. He had just returned to Canada from 
England where he had been recovering from the strain of nearly 
eleven months active service on the Western Front. Sharpe was one of 
the thousands of Canadian officers and soldiers who suffered mental 
stress injuries during the First World War. Commonly included under 
a broad definition of shell shock, the nervous debility and breakdown 
of soldiers represented a significant military and medical problem 
as well as a destabilising challenge to traditional gender and class 
assumptions. The suicide death of a prominent colonel and politician 
had the potential to undermine a cultural belief system that defined 
ideal masculinity through stoic strength, self-discipline, and willpower.
After assessing Sharpe’s professional and political background 
and detailing the psychological effect of his wartime experiences, 
this article connects the specific case study to medical and societal 
attitudes concerning masculinity, leadership, shell shock, and death. 
This case study examines the context and circumstances surrounding 
Sharpe’s breakdown and suicide in order to identify the influence of 
political ideology, public perceptions, and personal relationships in 
shaping reactions to war trauma. Rather than destabilise a concept of 
ideal masculinity or weaken a belief in willpower, medical responses 
to Sharpe’s case attempted to preserve social stability by interpreting 
his breakdown and death as conforming to the cultural expectations 
for a male leader of his status and position. The flexible and uncertain 
nature of shell shock and mental injuries allowed medical authorities 
to identify Sharpe as a genuine example of nervous collapse in contrast 
to other shell shock sufferers deemed illegitimate due to perceived 
malingering or inherently weak character. Complex and contradictory 
perceptions of shell shock and nervous breakdown, however, made for 
the problematic commemoration of a psychologically wounded officer. 
Public memorialisation initially incorporated Sharpe’s death into a 
wartime mythology that emphasised the necessary sacrifices and 
moral justifications of the conflict. Within a few years, a postwar 
public and political desire to purify the memory of tragedy and loss 
all but eclipsed remembrance of Sharpe and served to obscure the 
subversive implications of mental damage and self-destruction.
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political ideology and public service
Born on 13 March 1873 in Zephyr, Scott Township, Ontario, Samuel 
Simpson Sharpe was a graduate of Osgoode Hall and a prominent 
barrister and solicitor in the town of Uxbridge. He was a leading citizen 
in Ontario County with deep community and family ties through his 
marriage to Mabel Edith Crosby, granddaughter of businessman and 
political figure Joseph Gould.2 Sharpe’s social status as a middle-
class professional signified an expected duty to assume an active 
role in public life and perform civic responsibilities. As Andrew 
Holman argues, legal professionalism in Ontario small-towns served 
“as a potential source of cultural and political leadership.”3 Sharpe’s 
involvement in the Methodist Church, business associations, sports 
clubs, and the militia conferred a sense of prestige, influence, and 
authority. A committed militiaman, he joined the 34th Regiment at 
the age of sixteen, received a commission in 1894, and later advanced 
to the rank of major. In the October 1908 federal election, Sharpe 
was elected Conservative Member of Parliament for Ontario North. 
When the Conservative Party assumed power in 1911, the 
Borden government considered Sharpe for Minister of the Militia and 
Defence before the cabinet position went to rival Sam Hughes, six-
term Member of Parliament (mp) from neighbouring Victoria County.4 
In the House of Commons, Sharpe clashed with Hughes over militia 
policy and expressed frustration with the minister’s abrasive style. In 
one testy exchange in February 1914, Sharpe questioned whether the 
minister’s favoured Ross Rifle would be suitable for active combat. 
Hughes replied that his chosen rifle had yet to prove itself because 
“we have never had a chance to have a crack at anybody since they 
were adopted.”5 A year later, Hughes’ Ross Rifle would get its crack 
on the battlefields of France; as would Sam Sharpe.
2  Hector Charlesworth, A Cyclopedia of Canadian Biography (Toronto: The Hunter-
Rose Company, Limited, 1919), 100.
3  Andrew Holman, A Sense of Their Duty: Middle-Class Formation in Victorian 
Ontario Towns (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 53.
4  The Canadian Who Was Who, vol. I (Toronto: Trans-Canada Press, 1934), 463.
5  House of Commons. Debates, 12th Parliament, 3rd Session. (6 February 1914), 
518–519. Although a good target rifle, the Ross proved unsuited to battlefield service 
as it jammed with mud or dirt. The controversy was one of several factors that led 
to Hughes’ dismissal from cabinet in November 1916.
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When the British Empire declared war on Germany in August 
1914, Sharpe hoped to obtain an overseas command but was initially 
overlooked when the Canadian Expeditionary Force (Cef) organised 
at Valcartier, Quebec. Past disagreements with the militia minister 
proved a critical obstacle as Sharpe complained to Prime Minister 
Borden that “crazy” Hughes was “determined to humiliate me” and 
“ruin my life.”6 Although initially made second-in-command of the 
2nd Battalion, Sharpe was soon, in his words, “kicked out” at Hughes’ 
direction. Admitting that “the worry and anxiety are terrible,” 
Sharpe feared potential disgrace in the opinion of his constituents 
and the entire country.7 His failure to join the First Contingent 
prompted Thomas Gowans, Liberal editor of the Uxbridge Journal, 
to mock, “There was only one officer who flunked and ran home, 
6  Sharpe to Borden, 18 September 1914, Robert Borden Papers, MG 26H C-4214, 
12486.
7  Ibid., 12487–12488; Tim Cook, The Madman And The Butcher (Toronto: Penguin 
Canada, 2010), 64; Ronald G. Haycock, Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a 
Controversial Canadian, 1885–1916 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press), 
1986), 184.
Samuel Simpson Sharpe, 
Conservative MP for Ontario 
North, c. 1915. [Library of Congress 
LC-b2-2631-9]
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and that was the member for North Ontario.”8 Illustrating the 
significance of protecting a reputation against implied cowardice, 
Sharpe sued Gowans for defamatory libel and forced a retraction.9
By November 1915 the Ontario North mp finally secured the 
militia minister’s authorisation to form the 116th Battalion from 
Ontario County. As Sharpe had vowed to Borden during the 
Valcartier dispute, “I want to go to the front, and I want to go 
with my own Regiment.”10 Nearly all the officers belonged to the 
34th and many of the one-thousand volunteers were constituents 
in Sharpe’s parliamentary riding, which included the town of 
Uxbridge, the townships of Brock, Mara, Rama, Scott, and Thora, 
as well as the villages of Beaverton and Cannington. One of a dozen 
parliamentarians appointed to command a battalion, Sharpe also 
represented the typical background and social status of most Ontario 
infantry colonels. He belonged to the educated, professional middle-
class and held important community and political connections 
through Parliament, business, family, fraternal organisations, and the 
militia. Analyzing the recruitment system in Ontario, Paul Maroney 
states such officers comprised the local elite and were well-positioned 
to leverage their reputation and prestige to raise a unit.11
The 116th commander claimed that a military uniform symbolised 
the highest form of public service and felt his position as an elected 
representative made his own active participation in the war all the 
more vital. In an open letter to the citizens of the county, Sharpe 
declared, “We are fighting for an empire worthy of our best and 
8  “Editor Committed on Charge of Libel,” Toronto Globe, 19 April 1915, 11.
9  Gowans claimed to have been roughed up by Sharpe and his men in a street 
confrontation. Reprinted from the Uxbridge Journal in “The War in North Ontario,” 
Toronto Globe, 28 August 1914, 4. In a press interview, Hughes expressed approval of 
Sharpe’s alleged methods in “rawhiding the cowardly critic.” “Col. Hughes’ Vigorous 
Reply to Insinuations,” Toronto Globe, 4 September 1914, 9. At the same time, 
Hughes confided to Borden, “Personally, I have suspected him of being a sneak 
towards me for years” and accused Sharpe of wanting “a safe position.” Hughes to 
Borden, 21 September 1914, Borden Papers, MG 26H C-4214, 12510.
10  Sharpe to Borden, 18 September 1914, Borden Papers, MG 26H C-4214, 12489.
11  Paul Maroney, “The Great Adventure: The Context and Ideology of Recruiting 
in Ontario, 1914–1917,” Canadian Historical Review 77, no. 1 (1996), 65. Indicating 
the personal nature of organising a battalion, Sharpe’s officers included sons of 
prominent county officials as well as two nephews, Major Carson McCormack and 
Major H.V. Gould. His original second-in-command, Major Robert Burns Smith, was 
the son of fellow Conservative MP for Ontario South, William Smith.
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bravest.”12 Admitting that the history of the British Empire had been 
“marred occasionally by crimes of oppression and rapacity,” Sharpe 
nevertheless asserted that centuries of imperial rule “made for the 
peace, the happiness and the civilization of the world.”13 Believing 
that the dominion had shared in the privileges of the empire, he 
argued Canadians held a corresponding responsibility to come to 
its defence.  Sharpe’s perspective on the inseparable relationship 
between Canada and Britain reinforced Carl Berger’s argument that 
“imperialism was one form of Canadian nationalism.”14 
As Mark Moss argues this brand of British Canadian imperialism 
also reflected a dominant political ideology that merged patriotic 
nationalism with martial manliness.15 Before the war Ontario 
politicians, social reformers, clergy, and educators sought to instil 
in male students values of self-sacrifice, manly strength, and moral 
virtue. Sharpe contributed to the construction of this masculine ideal 
through his endorsement of public school education and the cadet 
movement as means to improve boys’ character and self-discipline. He 
stressed the need for the militia to “attract men of better character 
and better education.”16 By encouraging cadet training, militia duties, 
and sport activities, imperialist-minded civic leaders like Sharpe 
further hoped to develop every boy’s mind and body in preparation 
for an adulthood of patriotic public service and, if necessary, military 
service.17 
In an April 1915 lecture entitled “Inculcating the Spirit of 
Patriotism in our Public Schools,” Sharpe urged, “bringing forcibly 
to the impressionable minds of the young people the glorious 
achievements of the British arms.”18 Although he cautioned against 
promoting an excessive militaristic spirit and argued “Canada’s 
destiny lies along the paths of peaceful pursuits,” Sharpe maintained 
12  “Ontario County Unit Near Full Strength,” Whitby Gazette and Chronicle, 2 
March 1916, 1.
13  Sam Sharpe, “Patriotism in the Schools,” in Proceedings of the Fifty-Fourth 
Annual Convention of the Ontario Education Association, April 5–8, 1915 (Toronto: 
Warwick Bros and Rotter, Ltd, 1915), 343.
14  Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 
1867–1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 259.
15  Mark Moss, Manliness and Militarism: Educating Young Boys in Ontario for 
War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
16  House of Commons. Debates. 11th Parl., 2nd Sess. (30 April 1910), 8566.
17  Moss, Manliness and Militarism, 102, 117.
18  Sharpe, “Patriotism in the Schools,” 344.
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that it was the duty of every male citizen to take up arms in the 
crisis.19 As he explained during the recruitment campaign, “Boys 
must be made to realize, that it is not length of years that makes life 
worthwhile, but the quality of service.”20 By spring 1916, the 116th 
had been recruited to full strength. Witnessing the departure of the 
battalion from Uxbridge, prominent author and local resident Lucy 
Maud Montgomery recorded, “Poor fellows. I wonder how many of 
them will ever return.”21
at the sharp end
After leaving Canada from Halifax on 23 July 1916, the 116th 
Battalion arrived for training in England. Like nearly all of the 
newly disembarked battalions in summer 1916, Canadian military 
authorities drafted a large portion of the original volunteers into 
19  Ibid.
20  “Ontario County Unit Near Full Strength,” Whitby Gazette and Chronicle, 2 
March 1916, 1.
21  Mary Rubio and Elizabeth Waterson, eds., The Selected Journals of L.M. 
Montgomery: Volume II: 1910–1921 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1988), 184.
Sharpe addressing the 116th battalion before going overseas, Oshawa, Ontario, 1916. [Oshawa 
Public Library Lh2146]
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frontline units. Through Sharpe’s influence, and military necessity 
on the front, the 116th was, however, the last late-war infantry 
battalion to retain its designation when deployed to the battlefields 
of France in February 1917. Reinforced with soldiers drawn from 
various broken-up battalions, including the 126th (Peel) and the 
157th (Simcoe), the 116th still contained, in Sharpe’s words, “a goodly 
proportion of Ontario [County] boys.”22 Remarking on the unique 
distinction of the 116th going to the front as a whole unit, a 157th 
officer speculated, “They must have some pull.”23 Battalion chaplain 
John Garbutt meanwhile thought the “very unusual” decision was 
“a great compliment to our ... men and officers.”24 Attached to the 
9th Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Division in the Canadian Corps, the 
116th replaced the 60th (Victoria Rifles), which had been unable to 
sustain replacements from its home province of Quebec. Lieutenant 
Colonel F.A. Gascoigne of the 60th dismissed the substitution of 
his battle-hardened unit by a “green one.”25 The removal of a well-
respected battalion caused many soldiers in the brigade to initially 
resent the arrival of Sharpe’s “Baby Battalion.”26 
The 116th’s first experience in battle occurred during the assault 
on Vimy Ridge in early April 1917. Although not involved in the 
initial advance against the German fortifications, the battalion 
sustained casualties from heavy enemy bombardment. In mid-
July, Allied command ordered the battalion to conduct a major 
nighttime raid against German trenches near the village of Avion 
in preparation for the offensive against Hill 70 and Lens. Sharpe 
personally carried out reconnaissance of the enemy positions and 
barbed wire emplacements. On 23 July 1917, exactly one year after 
leaving Canada, the 116th advanced through machine-gun fire and 
tear gas to reach the German lines where they engaged the enemy in 
hand-to-hand combat. The successful raid contributed to Canadians’ 
22  Reprinted in “Col. Sharpe’s Last Message to People,” Toronto Daily Star, 25 
March 1919, 4.
23  Cecil Frost to parents, 10 January 1917, R.B. Fleming ed., The Wartime Letters 
of Leslie and Cecil Frost, 1915–1919 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 
2007), 112.
24  Rev. Garbutt to Dr. Garland, 8 January 1917, Canadian Letters and Images 
Project; Turner to Perley, 26 February 1917, Borden Papers, MG 26H C-4317, 39243.
25  War Diary, 60th Battalion. “Farwell Address,” 29 April 1917, RG9 III-D-3, v. 
4942, LAC.
26  [E. P. S. Allen], The 116th Battalion in France (Toronto: Hunter-Rose Co., Ltd., 
1921), 15-16.
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overall reputation as effective shock troops and earned praise from 
Corps Commander General Arthur Currie, which Sharpe claimed 
“helped to mitigate our grief in respect to our losses.”27 The 116th 
killed or captured over one hundred Germans, but the victory came 
with a high human cost. Describing the casualties after the raid, 
Sharpe remarked, “However, it is a stern game and we must be 
prepared to make the sacrifice.”28 In a letter to his wife Mabel, who 
had travelled to England, Sharpe projected the ideal temperament 
for a man in the midst of combat, enthusing, “The boys are splendid 
and all face the issues of death with a calmness that is magnificent.”29
Included among over thirty Canadians killed was Uxbridge 
resident Lieutenant Thomas Wilson Hutchison who had served with 
Sharpe for several years in the 34th Regiment. During the enemy 
counterattack at Avion an exploding shell seriously injured Hutchison 
in the company of Sharpe. The colonel, who was unwounded by 
the blast, rendered first aid and called for a stretcher party but 
Hutchison died two days later on 25 July.30 Writing to Hutchison’s 
widow, Muriel, on 21 October 1917, Sharpe not only conveyed his 
sympathies but also struggled to cope with the death of his fellow 
officer and friend. “We all do miss dear old Hutch so much!” he 
confessed, “No man in the Batt’n was more popular or more beloved 
by everyone—he occupied a unique position in that respect. He was 
so soldierly, so thorough—nature’s nobleman in every sense of the 
word.”31 The twenty-six year old Hutchison had married Muriel Pirt 
Vicars on 14 June 1916 just over one month before leaving Canada. 
While awaiting the battalion’s departure from Canada, Sharpe and 
his wife had hosted an officers’ dinner in honour of Hutchison and 
his new bride.32
27  Mark Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie: Diaries, 
Letters, and Report to the Ministry, 1917–1933 (Waterloo: LCMSDS/Wilfid Laurier 
University Press, 2008), 47; War Diary, 116th Battalion, “A Narrative of Operation 
on Night of 22/23 July, 1917,” RG9 III-D-3. v. 4945, LAC. 
28  Reprinted in “Col. Sharpe’s Unit Praised by Gen. Currie,” Toronto Globe, 14 
September 1917, 4.
29  Reprinted in “Letter by Col. Sharpe Held by Courts as Will,” Toronto Daily Star, 
19 December 1919, 5.
30  War Diary, 116th Battalion, “Supplement to the Narrative of the Raid,” 5 
September 1917. 
31  Sharpe to Hutchison, 21 October 1917.
32  “Col. And Mrs. Sharpe’s Dinner,” Toronto Daily Star, 11 July 1916, 8.
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In contrast to the morose tone of Sharpe’s letter to Muriel, in 
Canada, politicians, journalists, civilians, and returned soldiers 
celebrated the colonel as a patriotic war hero. Sharpe’s brother Bert 
stressed “when his men go in the trenches, he goes with them and 
stays there until they come out.”33 On 22 November 1917, Unionist 
supporters in Ontario North endorsed Sharpe’s re-nomination for the 
upcoming federal election. Speaking on behalf of the candidate to 
assembled delegates and voters, Sergeant Matt Wayman of the 116th 
delivered a special message from the front, “where my commanding 
officer is still carrying on.”34 For Wayman, the choice between the 
Laurier Opposition and the newly formed Unionist Government was 
simple: either “to quit before the Germans or to back the men at 
the front.”35 Laurier Liberal candidate Frederick Hogg reiterated 
his party’s stance against conscription to heckling from the crowd. 
On 26 November, Prime Minister Borden joined pro-conscription 
Liberals in Uxbridge to show bipartisan support for the Unionist 
ticket. Speaking beneath a banner, reading, “Vote for Sharpe, he is 
33  Bert Sharpe, “Col. Sharpe and Conscription,” Toronto Daily Star, 2 June 1917, 19.
34  “Returned Man Speaks in Support of his C.O.,” Toronto Daily Star, 22 November 
1917, 10.
35  Ibid.
Officers of the 116th battalion in Uxbridge, 1916. Sharpe is front row, second from right. 
Lieuetenant hutchison is back row, centre. [Uxbridge historical Centre Museum and Archives]
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fighting for you,” former Liberal Ontario South mp, Frederick Luther 
Fowke, called on voters to make the contest “as nearly unanimous 
as possible.”36 In the election result on 17 December, Sharpe defeated 
Hogg 3,123 votes to 1,568.37
Despite Wayman’s assurance that his colonel was “still carrying 
on,” the depressed attitude Sharpe had expressed in the Hutchison 
letter indicated the growing instability of his strained mental state. 
Sharpe remained in command of his unit until the end of December 
1917 when he was recalled to England in order to take a senior 
officer’s course at Aldershot. In one of his last messages to the 
people of Ontario County from the field, Sharpe expressed great 
reluctance to part with his men, writing, “The next few weeks will 
see much heavy fighting in France and I do not feel like leaving 
at this junction.”38 Major George Randolph Pearkes, who assumed 
command of the 116th, recalled, “everybody knew he wasn’t going to 
come back.”39 Shortly after receiving the Distinguished Service Order 
from the king at Buckingham Palace, Sharpe suffered a nervous 
breakdown and was admitted to the Canadian Convalescence 
Hospital at Buxton. Troubled by war dreams and worried over the 
welfare of his men, a despondent Sharpe “felt he was losing his grip 
on himself.”40 After two months of rest treatment, massage, and 
moral suggestion in hospital, Sharpe was released on compassionate 
grounds and returned to Canada with his wife in mid-May. He 
explained to Overseas Minister Edward Kemp, “The doctors say it 
will be sometime before I am myself again.”41
Instead of returning directly home, Sharpe stopped at Montreal 
for rest in the Royal Victoria Hospital while Mabel continued 
toward Uxbridge. He had earlier admitted “to the worry of meeting 
the electors [and] answering their questions about their boys.”42 
36  “Liberals Aid Old Opponent: Join Premier in Speaking for North Ontario 
Unionist,” Toronto Globe, 27 November 1917, 1, 3.
37  “13th General Election, 1917,” in Sessional Papers of the Dominion of Canada, 
vol. 4 (Ottawa: Thomas Mulvey, Printer, 1920), 68–69. Sharpe received the 
overwhelming share of soldier vote (443 to 16). 
38  Reprinted in “Col. Sharpe’s Last Message to the People,” Toronto Daily Star, 
25 March 1919, 4.
39  University of Victoria, Reg Roy collection. Pearkes interview 13, 9 November 
1965.
40  Sam Sharpe Service File, RG150, Box 8807-52, LAC.
41  Sharpe to Kemp, 17 April 1918. RG9 III-A-1, v. 330, 10-S-173, LAC.
42  Sharpe to Kemp, 10 April 1918. RG9 III-A-1, v. 330, 10-S-173, LAC.
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On 25 May 1918, in the absence of a nurse, Sharpe jumped to his 
death through a window of the Ross Pavilion on to the concrete 
pavement fracturing his skull. As Quebec news bulletins reported, 
the colonel had been ill with a “nervous affliction and insomnia” 
since treatment in England.43 Sharpe’s case mirrors the findings in 
Patricia Prestwich’s study of suicide in the French Army during the 
First World War. Based on the French experience, those who died 
by suicide were generally older infantry officers in their late-thirties 
or forties. Most of the deaths occurred behind the lines or on the 
home front while on leave in barracks or hospitals.44
Examining the context surrounding Sharpe’s reaction to war 
trauma provides important insights into the types of stresses for a 
man of his social position, rank, and experience. Patrick Brennan 
identifies the crucial importance of studying the psychological 
pressures endured by Cef commanders when assessing leadership and 
battlefield performance. Mental overstrain from frontline command 
and military administration were significant challenges for even the 
most motivated colonels and generals.45 In addition to the obligations 
of a commanding officer, Sharpe also assumed responsibilities as a 
father figure and an elected representative. As Craig Mantle argues, 
the ethic of paternalism in the Cef defined effective and honourable 
leadership through the duty of each commander to put the needs of 
his men first.46
Reverend Garbutt commented that Sharpe showed an unusually 
high interest in his men’s physical, mental, and moral welfare.47 When 
the 116th Battalion departed Uxbridge in spring 1916, a banner 
stretched across the main road read, “God Bless Our Soldier Men, 
Send Them Home Safe Again.”48 The 1921 battalion history stated 
43  “Col. S. Sharpe Met an Untimely Death,” Quebec Chronicle, 27 May 1918, 1.
44  Patricia Prestwich, “Suicide and French Soldiers of the First World War: 
Differing Perspectives, 1914–1939,” in John Weaver and David Wright, eds., 
Histories of Suicide: International Perspectives on Self-Destruction in the Modern 
World (Toronto: UofT Press, 2008), 135–155.
45  Patrick Brennan, “‘Completely Worn Out by Service in France’: Combat Stress 
and Breakdown among Senior Officers in the Canadian Corps,” Canadian Military 
History 18, no. 2 (2009), 5–14.
46  Craig Leslie Mantle, “Stripes, Pips and Crowns: A Preliminary Study of Leader-
Follower Relations in the Canadian Expeditionary Force during the First World 
War, 1914–1918,” PhD thesis, University of Calgary, 2013, 36–95.
47  “Chaplin’s Tribute to Dead Command,” Toronto Daily Star, 25 March 1919, 4.
48  J. Peter Hvidsten, Uxbridge—The First 100 Years (Port Perry, ON: Observer 
Publishing, 2010), 164.
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the colonel’s principal objective was “to get through the ‘baptism of 
fire’ with as much glory and as few casualties as possible.”49 Acting 
Prime Minister Thomas White eulogised the forty-five year old 
childless Sharpe in 1919 as having “displayed an almost fatherly 
regard” for the men under his command.50
While he may have been a courageous colonel and a conscientious 
leader, Sharpe’s lack of prior combat experience made him particularly 
susceptible to mental injury. As one of the only late-war county 
battalion colonels to lead his troops in the field, Sharpe was also 
one of the most inexperienced unit commanders in the Canadian 
Corps during the 1917 campaign. Unlike veteran field officers who 
had risen through the ranks, Sharpe and his senior officers were as 
unaccustomed as their men to the dangers and difficulties of trench 
warfare. Sharpe’s law partner in Uxbridge, Major Henry Porter 
Cooke of “A” Company, lasted only a few months on the front until 
he was evacuated sick in June 1917. After being gassed, Cooke was 
found to be “jumpy” and a medical board determined his condition 
was “in all probability of a nervous origin.”51 Within six months 
on the front, only one of Sharpe’s original company commanders 
remained on duty.52 By December 1917, Sharpe’s nephew, Major 
Harold Victor Gould, suffered a breakdown which forced him from 
the field as well.53
During the seven months between the first casualties at 
Vimy Ridge and Sharpe’s October letter to Muriel Hutchison, the 
116th Battalion lost nearly one hundred men. By the time Sharpe 
left France at the end of December 1917 following the battle of 
Passchendaele the unit had sustained over forty further deaths. Of 
the total dead in the 116th under Sharpe’s command, twenty-six 
were volunteers recruited from Ontario County and six also belonged 
to the 34th Regiment.54 Reacting to the deaths of fellow militia 
officers Lieutenants John James Doble, William Kitchener Kift, and 
Henry Lawrence Major after Vimy Ridge, Sharpe explained to his 
49  [Allen], The 116th Battalion in France, 17.
50  Canada. House of Commons. Debates, 13th Parl., 2nd Sess. (20 February 1919), 3.
51  H.P. Cooke Service File, RG150, Box 1946-16, LAC.
52  [Allen], The 116th Battalion in France, 28.
53  H.V. Gould Service File, RG150, Box 3676-15, LAC.
54  116th Battalion deaths: 17 February to 21 October 1917 (98); 22 October to 31 
December 1917 (44); 1 January to 25 May 1918 (24, including Sharpe)
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sister “Old Ontario County is paying its toll in the great struggle.”55 
In another personal loss, a cousin, Charles Simpson Lennox, died 
during the Avion raid.56 As the number of original Ontario County 
troops dwindled due to breakdown, injury, and death, replacements 
arrived from Toronto and other parts of the country. Pearkes thought 
his predecessor “had personal courage but lacked leadership. And he 
was too inclined to play favourites and to try and save the people 
that he had originally recruited.”57 New reinforcements consequently 
only highlighted the absence of dead friends, constituents, and fellow 
militiamen. During the months away from his battalion in hospital, 
Sharpe could only ponder the deaths of his “best and bravest” whom 
he had personally recruited, such as Lieutenant Hutchison.
News of Sharpe’s sudden death shocked the citizens of Uxbridge 
and Ontario County who had assumed their colonel was recovering 
and were awaiting his return. His body was transported from Montreal 
to Whitby in order to lie in state at the county council chambers 
before arriving in Uxbridge for a public service officiated by Garbutt, 
the original 116th chaplain. The military funeral on 29 May 1918 
attracted thousands of civilian mourners, army officials, returned 
soldiers, and government dignitaries. In describing the ceremony, a 
local newspaper noted, “Col. Sharpe lay in his flag draped bier, and 
even in death looked the fine brave hero that he was.”58 On 9 June, 
the 116th held its own service for its former commander.59 Writing 
in her journal, L.M. Montgomery, who had voted for Sharpe in 1917, 
conveyed the sense of many in the community when she attributed 
the colonel’s suicide to a mind “insane from shell-shock.”60
55  Quoted in Ted Barris, Victory at Vimy: Canada Comes of Age, (Toronto: 
Dundurn, 2007), 173.
56  “Lt.-Col. Sam Sharpe Was Said to Be Missing,” Whitby Gazette and Chronicle, 
2 August 1917, 1. 
57  Pearkes interview 13, 9 November 1965; Reginald Roy, For Most Conspicuous 
Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C, Through Two 
World Wars (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1977), 65–66.
58  “Honors for Col. S. Sharpe,” Newmarket Era, 31 May 1918, 3.
59  War Diary. 116th Battalion, 9 June 1918.
60  Rubio and Waterson, eds., The Selected Journals of L.M. Montgomery, 247. 
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interpreting shell shock
By 1918, the phrase “shell shock” had entered the public vernacular 
as a catch-all to describe affected soldiers’ emotional and physical 
symptoms, which ranged from insomnia and depression to tremors 
and limb paralysis. The difficult-to-categorise phenomenon provoked 
social and medical debates over the nature of war trauma, mental 
resiliency, and nervous breakdown. Disagreements over whether 
the condition was innate or acquired reflected uncertainty over the 
root cause. Some doctors pointed to the physical concussion of shell 
explosions or to nervous overstrain following trauma while others 
attempted to locate the problem in the individual psychological 
disposition of each soldier.61 Shell shock represented both a serious 
military manpower problem as well as a potential challenge to a 
61  Tom Brown, “Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914–1918: 
Canadian Psychiatry in the Great War,” in Charles G. Roland, ed. Health, Disease, 
and Medicine: Essays in Canadian History (Hamilton, ON: Hannah Institute for 
the History of Medicine, 1983), 310–313; Tracey Loughran, “Shell Shock, Trauma, 
and the First World War: The Making of a Diagnosis and Its Histories,” Social 
History of Medicine 22, no. 1 (2009), 83–88; Ben Shephard, War of Nerves Soldiers 
and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 109–112.
Sharpe’s funeral in Uxbridge, 29 May 1918. [Uxbridge historical Centre Museum and Archives]
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traditional Victorian and Edwardian model of ideal masculinity. In 
the rich historiography on the topic, historians have studied how 
prevailing cultural attitudes towards gender and class shaped the 
political meanings and interpretations of shell shock.62
Many military and medical officials drew on nineteenth-
century understandings of mental disease, hereditary weakness, and 
degeneration to diagnose soldiers afflicted by nervous symptoms. 
Contemporary theories of mental illness portrayed certain men 
with alleged weak moral fibre and character defects as unsuited for 
the stress of combat. Rather than cause psychological problems, 
traumatic experiences in battle were often assumed to only trigger a 
latent susceptibility for nervous breakdown.63 Reflecting beliefs about 
the feminine nature of hysteria, some medical officers attributed 
cases of shell shock and nervous exhaustion to the sufferers’ perceived 
cowardice, effeminacy, or weakness. Examining the construction of 
shell shock as a social disease, George Mosse observes, “War was 
the supreme test of manliness, and those who were the victims of 
shell-shock had failed this test.”64 Influenced by perceptions of racial 
and class superiority, some medical commentators further believed 
that working-class and ethnic minority recruits would be susceptible 
to breakdowns while an educated officer class would be immune. 
The reality that combat stress did not discriminate between different 
classes, ranks, or education levels seemed to destabilise certain 
assumptions about the essential nature of masculine resiliency. Ted 
Bogacz argues that the contradictions of shell shock “shattered” 
British prewar military values, but it is important to also trace the 
62  Cultural and gender histories of shell shock include, Elaine Showalter, The 
Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 1830–1980 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1985); Joanna Bourke, Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, 
Britain, and the Great War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Laurinda 
Stryker, “Mental Cases: British Shellshock and the Politics of Interpretation,” in 
Gail Braybon, ed., Evidence, History, and the Great War: Historians and the Impact 
of 1914–18 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 154–171; Tracey Loughran, “A Crisis 
of Masculinity? Re-writing the History of Shell-Shock and Gender in First World 
War Britain,” History Compass 11, no. 9 (2013), 727–738. 
63  Loughran, “Shell Shock, Trauma, and the First World War,” 83–85.
64  George Mosse, “Shell-Shock as a Social Disease,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 35, no. 1 (2000), 104.
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persistence of an idealised conception of masculinity through the 
course of the war.65
While shell shock was often portrayed as the antithesis of the 
Victorian and Edwardian masculine construct, historians have 
identified the important ways shell shock was also reconfigured in 
an attempt to preserve a cultural belief system rooted in traditional 
manly values. Michael Roper notes that the war prompted a 
reassessment of prewar assumptions concerning courage and fear, but 
commentators sought to “modify rather than abandon the tradition 
of stoic manliness.”66 Jay Winter suggests that the very term shell 
shock served to validate soldiers’ disorders in ways that more 
stigmatised and feminine diagnoses like hysteria could not.67 Chris 
Feudtner argues that the language and ritual of shell shock provided 
men with the ability to display feelings of misery and despair under 
certain circumstances without being thought as weak, malingering, 
or cowardly.68 Mark Humphries reveals how it could be deemed 
acceptable for “real men” to break down following a long period 
of stress on the frontline or after a traumatic experience but those 
who collapsed too quickly, exaggerated their symptoms, or failed to 
demonstrate appropriate resolve made their masculinity suspect.69 
According to some medical commentators, the same qualities 
that seemed to make good commanding officers, namely intelligence, 
conscientiousness, and strong principles, also seemed to make 
them more vulnerable to debilitating mental stress.70 Prior to the 
war, overstrained businessmen and politicians—the same group of 
middle-class professionals who filled senior officer ranks in the Cef—
65  Ted Bogacz, “War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England, 1914–22: The 
Work of the War Office Committee of Enquiry into ‘Shell-Shock,’” Journal of 
Contemporary History 24, no. 2 (1989), 247–248.
66  Roper, “Between Manliness and Masculinity: The ‘War Generation’ and the 
Psychology of Fear in Britain, 1914–1950,” Journal of British Studies 44, no. 2 
(2005), 356.
67  Jay Winter, “Shell-Shock and the Cultural History of the Great War,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 35, no. 1 (2000), 9
68  Chris Feudtner, “‘Minds the Dead Have Ravished’: Shell Shock, History, and the 
Ecology of Disease-Systems,” History of Science 31, no. 4 (1993), 403–404.
69  Mark Humphries, “War’s Long Shadow: Masculinity, Medicine, and the Gendered 
Politics of Trauma, 1914–1939,” Canadian Historical Review 91, no. 3 (2010), 517–
518.
70  Edgar Jones, “The Psychology of Killing: The Combat Experience of British 
Soldiers during the First World War,” Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 1 
(2006), 232.
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received a diagnosis of neurasthenia due to a belief that sufferers 
had exhausted a finite amount of nervous energy. As Humphries 
and Kellen Kurchinski note, in the late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century, neurasthenia could be “quite fashionable” 
as a sign that the patient led a strenuous, modern lifestyle with 
important civic and career responsibilities.71 When certain battalion 
commanders began to display similar neurasthenic symptoms such 
as depression and anxiety after months in the trenches, medical 
officers understood the problem through this prewar model of 
civilian medicine.72 Although Humphries and Kurchinski find that 
the diagnosis of Canadian shell shock and neurasthenia patients was 
not determined by rigid class distinctions, rank and social standing 
still influenced how political, military, and medical leaders as well as 
the public perceived prominent individuals who showed “nerves.”73
According to Colonel Jack Currie, Conservative-Unionist mp 
for Simcoe North, suffering a nervous collapse was emblematic of 
strength and patriotism because it was the best evidence that a 
soldier had experienced actual combat conditions. In a 1919 House of 
Commons speech, he highlighted the example of his Ontario North 
colleague who “went to the trenches and would not leave them until 
his health broke down and he was a complete wreck.”74 Commenting 
on Sharpe’s death in Montreal, Currie declared, “no wonder, when 
he spent two years and a half [sic] constantly within the sound of 
the guns, constantly in the midst of great carnage.”75 A founding 
officer of the 48th Highlanders in 1891, Currie had commanded the 
15th Battalion at the second battle of Ypres in April 1915 before 
a controversial incident led to his dismissal. “His nervous system 
having been completely shattered in the campaign in Flanders,” 
71  Mark Humphries with Kellen Kurchinski, “Rest, Relax and Get Well: A Re-
Conceptualisation of Great War Shell Shock Treatment,” War and Society 27, 
no. 2 (2008), 98; Janet Oppenheim, ““Shattered Nerves”: Doctors, Patients, and 
Depression in Victorian England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 144; 
Shephard, A War of Nerves, 9
72  Patrick Brennan, “Completely Worn Out by Service in France,” 7–8; Brown, 
“Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914–1918,” 318; Loughran, 
“Shell Shock, Trauma, and the First World War,” 83.
73  Humphries with Kurchinski, “Rest, Relax and Get Well,” 95.
74  House of Commons. Debates, 13th Parl., 2nd Sess. (17 March 1919), 549.
75  Ibid.
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Currie returned home following allegations that he had been drunk 
behind the lines during the German gas attack at St. Julien.76
Currie’s opinion of Sharpe illustrated the mutability of shell 
shock and nervous breakdown as signs of either masculine strength 
or weakness. Early in the war, Currie had believed “red-blooded” 
Canadian troops were incapable of mental exhaustion while the 
cowardly Germans often showed “nerves.” In his 1916 memoir, The 
Red Watch, which attempted to justify his actions at St. Julien, 
Currie claimed, “I did not feel at all nervous, as a matter of fact after 
a person has been under shell and rifle fire for a few days he ceases to 
be nervous. Nerves are for those who stay at home.”77 After defending 
himself against public accusations of cowardice and incompetence, 
by 1919 Currie had moderated this rhetoric to admit “many of 
our bravest men have succumbed to mental trouble.”78 Politicians 
like Currie adopted a flexible interpretation of combat stress and 
breakdown because the unacceptable alternative was to admit that 
prominent officers including Sharpe and himself had either behaved 
cowardly or lacked the mental self-discipline to persevere.
Canadian neurologist Major George F. Boyer, one of the doctors 
who treated Sharpe at Buxton, separated legitimate cases of nervous 
exhaustion from supposed cowards and malingerers. In a November 
1939 paper recounting his experience treating psychoneurosis and 
neurasthenia during the First World War, Boyer emphasised the 
crucial importance of the sufferers’ mental make-up and self-control 
in dictating treatment methods. Describing a “real case” of nervous 
breakdown, Boyer outlined the expected behaviour and temperament 
for a patient of Sharpe’s prominence and social position:
He has, as a rule, served two or three or more times the duration of 
arduous conditions than the more common anxiety case. He is driven 
by duty. The will is willing and impels, but the frame fails. He needs, 
76  John Carson to War Office, 22 June 1915. RG9 III-A-1, v. 126, 6-C-63, LAC; 
Andrew Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers: The 1st Canadian Division at War, 1914–1915 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 161–162; For more on the aftermath 
of the dugout incident see “Chapter 8: Another Currie” in Robert Sharpe, The Last 
Day, The Last Hour: The Currie Libel Trial (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2009), 117–130.
77  J. A. Currie, The Red Watch: With the First Canadian Division in Flanders 
(London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1916), 200.
78  House of Commons. Debates, 13th Parl., 3rd Sess. (19 September 1919), 310.
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and may have to be made, to accept evacuation. His ideal is high, but 
his capacity has its limitations and he has usually exhausted it. He 
convalesces slowly. His ideal directs his conduct. He is a co-operative 
patient. He confesses his symptoms with reluctance, he often reproaches 
himself for the loss of a comrade in some real or assumed error in 
judgment or action. He is worthy of the best his officers and physicians 
can give. Constitutionally, he is of that stuff whose ideals are hard on 
his emotions and his emotions and sentiments are hard on his ideals.79
According to Boyer, a long-serving soldier who had spent his reserve 
of nervous energy in a leadership role and was reticent to both report 
symptoms and seek treatment represented an admirable type. A true 
neurasthenic acquired the temporary condition through frontline 
service and could not be dismissed as effeminate or cowardly, thereby 
ensuring masculinity and reputation were preserved.80 By contrast, 
Boyer felt a “hysterical reactor” either lacked the willpower to 
improve or deliberately willed ill health to avoid military duty. “He 
is usually shrewd, alert, evasive, egotistic, a poor adjuster,” Boyer 
claimed, “often nurses a grievance—a man with a conduct sheet.” 
Whereas a “real case” benefited from thoughtful dialogue and firm 
encouragement over mawkish sympathy, Boyer argued the hysteric 
“is ‘cured,’ only to relapse.”81
The reality that a senior officer like Sharpe had broken down was 
not necessarily the most troubling issue from a medical and societal 
perspective. The larger threat shell shock posed to traditional gender 
and class assumptions was the apparent inability of some individuals 
to overcome temporary nervous collapse by becoming permanent 
psychologically disturbed casualties.82 Mosse observes that by 
defining shell shock as a disease, military and medical authorities 
implied “true” sufferers could be cured.83 Feudtner stresses that the 
disease was conceived as an “ongoing individual psychological battle” 
within the mind of each officer and soldier.84 Fiona Reid notes even 
compassionate doctors assumed a good soldier should recuperate 
79  George F. Boyer, “The Psychoneuroses of War,” Canadian Medical Association 
Journal 43, no. 1 (1940), 55.
80  Humphries, “War’s Long Shadow,” 511, 516.
81  Boyer, “The Psychoneuroses of War,”  55
82  Humphries, “War’s Long Shadow,” 530.
83  Mosse, “Shell-Shock as a Social Disease,” 104–106.
84  Feudtner, “Minds the Dead Have Ravished,” 403.
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quickly and the very term breakdown meant men could be mended.85 
Recovery depended on the foresightedness of a potential nervous 
casualty to recognise the problem through a long struggle and to rely 
on individual determination to persevere. Rather than undermine 
a traditional emphasis on manly strength and self-discipline, this 
interpretation of nervous collapse seemed to confirm the fundamental 
belief that strong personal character and internal fortitude could 
overcome any psychological debility including inner doubt and fear.
Indeed, when Sharpe wrote to Muriel Hutchison, “were I to allow 
myself to ponder over what I have seen [and] what I have suffered,” 
he framed his mental trouble as a choice. He identified depression as 
a test of willpower and perseverance by suggesting as long as he did 
not dwell on the horror and deaths he had witnessed he could control 
negative emotions and despondency. Sharpe indicated if the effort 
to turn his mind away from the misery of war failed, he expected 
inevitable collapse. From the perspective of Sharpe and his doctors, 
the final breakdown in early 1918 fit the cultural expectations of a 
commanding officer because it occurred away from his men and only 
after months of professed struggle. Within several weeks at Buxton, 
doctors believed Sharpe had improved and, as Boyer recorded, “He 
understands the effect of his experiences in France and realizes his 
‘nerves get’ him at times.”86 Acknowledging and confronting the trigger 
for a mental breakdown was presumed to help restore the patient’s 
confidence, self-knowledge, and self-control.87 Through techniques of 
persuasion and suggestion, Boyer believed neurasthenic soldiers “will 
be better able to cope with disturbances ... after their complexes have 
been ‘dug up’ and ‘aired.’”88 The heroic narrative arc of recovery and 
perseverance through self-awareness and willpower however did not 
easily provide for circumstances when a patient instead succumbed 
to suicide. 
85  Fiona Reid, Broken Men: Shell Shock, Treatment and Recovery in Britain 1914–
1930,  (London: Continuum, 2010), 64, 161, 166
86  Sharpe Service File.
87  Brown, “Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914–1918,” 319.
88  George F. Boyer, “The Treatment of the Psychoneuroses,” Canadian Medical 
Association Journal 11, no. 9 (1921), 680.
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interpreting suicide
While shell shock had earned a degree of honour and legitimacy in 
the wartime public imagination, suicide remained a largely taboo 
subject as a violation of Christian ethics and societal norms. By 
the early twentieth century, historians note a shift toward greater 
public sympathy for suicide due to secularisation in society and 
the medicalisation of mental illness.89 Studying public perceptions 
of suicide in late nineteenth century Ontario, Janet Miron 
stresses that responses nevertheless “defied simple acceptance or 
complete decriminalization.”90 In Sharpe’s case, initial news reports 
acknowledged he had jumped to his death, but subsequent sources 
tended to understate the suicide. The Toronto World called the 
death a “sad accident,” 91 a 1919 biographical sketch stated he had 
“succumbed ... to a nervous disorder,”92 and a 1938 obituary for 
Mabel noted that her late husband “went overseas and to his death 
as a result.”93 
Due to the silences that often accompany the topic, determining 
the level of military suicide within the Canadian Corps during the 
First World War is problematic. An unknown number of suicidal 
deaths may have been misattributed, unreported, or occurred during 
the confusion of battle. Furthermore suicide remained stigmatised as 
a violation of military law. Viewing self-harm as a discipline problem, 
section 38 (2) of the Army Act made attempted suicide an offence 
punishable by court martial.94 In his study on self-inflicted wounding 
in the Cef, Humphries emphasises how self-harm represented a 
direct challenge to military authority and state control over soldiers’ 
89  For social and cultural studies of suicide see Olive Anderson, Suicide in Victorian 
and Edwardian England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Victor Bailey, ““This 
Rash Act”: Suicide Across the Life Cycle in the Victorian City (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998); Michael MacDonald and Terence Murphy, Sleepless Souls: 
Suicide in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Terri 
L. Snyder, “What Historians Talk About When They Talk About Suicide: The 
View from Early Modern British North America,” History Compass 5, no. 2 (2007), 
658–674.
90  Janet Miron, “Suicide, Coroner’s Inquests, and the Parameters of Compassion in 
Ontario, 1830–1900,” Histoire sociale/Social history 47, no. 95 (2014), 577.
91  “Ontario County Pays Honor to Col. Sharpe,” Toronto World, 27 May 1918, 12.
92  Charlesworth, A Cyclopedia of Canadian Biography, 101.
93  “Widow of the Late Col. Sam Sharpe Dead,” Stouffville Tribune, 3 March 1938, 1.
94  War Office, Manual of Military Law (London: HMSO, 1907), 298.
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bodies.95 Ironically, whereas a man who attempted suicide might 
be punished, a suicidal soldier who succeeded could, under certain 
circumstances, be regarded with compassion and sympathy.
Popular reassessment of nervous breakdown as a potentially 
legitimate casualty resulted in a growing awareness that sufferers 
gripped by severe depression or confusion were not always accountable 
for their behaviour.96 A possible connection to suicidal actions in 
turn impacted how governments approached granting honours and 
pensions to soldiers’ surviving families. As Peter Barham points out, 
during the course of the war British pension boards demonstrated 
a greater readiness to grant funds to dependants when a soldier’s 
suicide was deemed with “reasonable probability” to be a direct 
result of wartime conditions. Reflecting the persistence of prewar 
cultural mores, pension officials nevertheless reserved the right to 
withhold funds in cases of misconduct and where the suicide had been 
committed to avoid justice or military duty.97 Although not focused 
on the issue of military suicide, historians Desmond Morton, Glenn 
Wright, and Terry Copp identify how the question of “attributability” 
was similarly a central concern for Canadian pension boards in 
deciding the legitimacy of cases involving shell shock and suspected 
self-inflicted injury.98 
Addressing concerns that widows and families of soldiers who 
had died by suicide might be denied support, Major W.A. Burgess, 
medical advisor to the Board of Pensions Commission, reported to 
a House of Commons special committee in 1920, “the benefit of 
the doubt is given to dependents in every case. It must be a very 
clear cut case where it [a pension] is refused.”99 At least in public 
95  Mark Humphries, “Wilfully and With Intent: Self-Inflicted Wounds and the 
Negotiation of Power in the Trenches,” Social history 47, no. 94 (2014), 373.
96  Caroline Cox, “Invisible Wounds: The American Legion, Shell Shocked Veterans, 
and American Society, 1919–1924,” in Mark S. Micale and Paul Lerner, eds., 
Traumatic Pasts: History, Psychiatry, and Trauma in the Modern Age, 1870–1930 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 297–298.
97  Peter Barham, Forgotten Lunatics of the Great War (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004), 129–133.
98  Desmond Morton, Fight Or Pay: Soldiers’ Families in the Great War (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 147–150; Desmond Morton and Glenn 
T. Wright, Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to Civilian 
Life, 1915–1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 56–57; Terry Copp and 
Mark Osborne Humphries, Combat Stress in the 20th Century: The Commonwealth 
Perspective (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010), 81–93.
99  House of Commons. Journals. 13th Parl., 4th Sess. vol. 57 (26 April 1920), 217.
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rhetoric, Canadian pension officials and parliamentarians espoused 
a basic belief that the suicide of a soldier ought to be considered a 
war-related death barring evidence to the contrary. For her part, 
Mabel Sharpe received the annual allowance of a lieutenant colonel’s 
widow. In October 1917, her husband had reassured her, “I have left 
lots for you, and you will get a pension of $1,500 a year in case I am 
killed in service.”100 Given prevailing belief in his brave conduct on 
the front as well as his prominence as an officer and politician, there 
seemed to be no question Sharpe’s death was attributable to service 
on the battlefield.
In public eulogies and commemorations, the people of Ontario 
preferred to represent the colonel as a heroic casualty of war rather 
than a broken, desperate man. The managing editor of the Toronto 
Globe, Stewart Lyon, praised Sharpe’s courage and leadership, 
asserting, “He gave up his life as truly ‘on the field of honor’ as 
100  Reprinted in “Letter by Col. Sharpe Held by Courts as Will,” Toronto Daily 
Star, 19 December 1919, 5; “Will’s Interpretation Ends in Legal Dispute,” Toronto 
Daily Star, 8 October 1919, 4.
Lieutenant Colonel Sharpe, commander 
of the 116th battalion [Ontario regiment 
Museum]
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if he had fallen in action.”101 According to Lyon, who had earlier 
reported on the Avion raid as a war correspondent, Sharpe’s nervous 
breakdown and sudden death confirmed that he was no mere “political 
colonel” who had sought “cheap and easy glory.”102 A posthumous 
biographical sketch similarly portrayed him “As truly a victim of the 
great struggle as if he had been killed in action.”103 When a bronze 
statue was dedicated to honour Lieutenant Colonel Harry Baker, 
the only Canadian mp killed in battle, the Globe reminded readers 
“Sharpe’s death was the result of service in France.”104
Jonathan Scotland identifies how Toronto press reporting of 
soldier suicide immediately after the war revealed a general acceptance 
that such deaths were considered a consequence of traumatic war 
experiences.105 When Lieutenant Charles Vesta Victoria Coombs of 
the 116th shot himself in London, England on 26 December 1919, 
a correspondent for the Globe stated, “Everybody feels that it is as 
if he had died at the hands of the enemy.”106 Coombs had reported 
being gassed and “knocked out” by a shell explosion during the 
Avion raid. Exhibiting a noticeable nervous tremor, he was diagnosed 
with neurasthenia and spent over a year in and out of hospital 
before being attached to the British War Records Office.107 The 
Globe went so far as to praise the officer “who feared not to end the 
life which battle wounds had made unbearable.”108 Recasting suicide 
as analogous to combat death allowed the press to portray soldiers 
who killed themselves as battle-wounded heroes. Sympathetic press 
coverage implied, unlike a perceived hysteric shell shock patient 
who never recovered, a soldier who ended his life preserved his 
masculine reputation. Describing how suicidal men sought to follow 
101  [Stewart Lyon], “The Last Measure of Devotion,” Toronto Globe, 27 May 1918, 6.
102  Ibid.
103  The Canadian Who Was Who, 464.
104  F.C. Mears, “Fallen Solider M.P. Honored in Bronze,” Toronto Globe, 27 
December 1923, 1. George Harold Baker was Conservative MP for Brome and 
commander of the 5th Canadian Mounted Rifles. He was killed at the battle of 
Sanctuary Wood on 2 June 1916.
105  Jonathan Scotland, “Soldier Suicide after the Great War: A First Look,” Active 
History (24 March 2014), available: http://activehistory.ca/2014/03/soldier-suicide-
after-the-great-war-a-first-look/, [Accessed 1 May 2014].
106  Harold Steevens, “As if He Had Died at the Hands of the Enemy,” Toronto 
Globe, 29 December 1919, 2.
107  C.V.V. Coombs Service File, RG150, Box 1961-36, LAC.
108  Harold Steevens, “Capt. Coombs Rests in a Soldier Grave,” Toronto Globe, 3 
January 1920, 2.
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the expected “script of masculinity” during the First World War era, 
John Weaver observes “to endure mental or physical anguish truly 
required bravery, but courage also was claimed by individuals who 
chose death.”109
At the same time, the image of psychologically damaged and 
suicidal soldiers threatened to destroy the perception of an honourable 
and just war that four years of propaganda and political rhetoric 
had created.110 Tracing how medical and social responses to shell 
shock sought to reinforce societal stability, Tracy Loughran argues 
that wartime psychological theories of insanity, which tended to root 
the cause in the mental make-up of each soldier, “absolve[ed] the 
war of ultimate responsibility for breakdown.”111 Studying public 
responses to suicide in Ontario, Miron points out “If an individual 
challenged social ideals by committing suicide, then the community 
and its sense of well-being could be re-established through the notion 
of temporary insanity.”112 Unlike in chronic cases of shell shock 
and neurasthenia, an explanation of temporary insanity allowed 
commentators to understand how the deaths of heroes like Sharpe 
and Coombs were war-related without admitting that either man 
possessed an inherently weak nervous system, or that the conflict 
was fundamentally immoral.
Influenced by anti-war sentiment or disillusionment following 
massive casualties on the front, Sharpe’s suicide might have appeared 
to some a destabilising indictment of the war as wasteful and 
unnecessary. Yet rather than undermine confidence in the war as a 
virtuous defence of civilisation, initial public and political reaction to 
Sharpe’s death served to reinforce a narrative of heroism and victory. 
Articulating the wartime mythology of crusading virtue and noble 
sacrifice, Liberal House Leader James Robb, mp for Châteauguay—
Huntingdon, declared Sharpe had “unsheathed his sword and went 
forth to do battle in the cause of freedom and justice.”113 The Toronto 
109  John Weaver, Sadly Troubled History: The Meanings of Suicide in the Modern 
Age (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 272. For similar conclusions 
in the context of the American Civil War see Diane Miller Sommerville, “‘A Burden 
Too Heavy to Bear’: War Trauma, Suicide, and Confederate Soldiers,” Civil War 
History 59, no. 4, (2013), 453–491.
110  Jonathan Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 53–54.
111  Loughran, “Shell Shock, Trauma, and the First World War,” 87.
112  Miron, “Suicide, Coroner’s Inquests,” 598.
113  House of Commons. Debates, 13th Parl., 2nd Sess. (20 February 1919), 3.
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Daily Star likewise explained he “gave his life as a result of his 
gallantry in the cause of freedom.”114 Examining British Canadian 
attempts to stress the utility of the conflict, Jonathan Vance argues 
commemorations and eulogies produced popular myths designed to 
purify the memory of violence and destruction.115
Writing to Mabel on 21 October 1917 shortly before the battle of 
Passchendaele, Sharpe had affirmed his faith in the moral, patriotic 
sentiment that later informed postwar remembrance:
If it should be my fate to be among those who fall, I wish to say I have 
no regrets to offer. I have done my duty as I saw it and have fought in 
defence of those principles upon which our great Empire is founded, and 
I die without any fears as to the ultimate destiny of all that is immortal 
within me.116
On the same day that Sharpe had confided his doubts to Muriel 
Hutchison about the sacrifice of so many lives, the message to his 
wife represented an attempt to infuse death with a meaningful 
higher purpose. Imagining that all of the war dead had recognised 
and accepted their necessary sacrifice helped the grieving public 
cope with the great loss of life. Confident in the righteousness of 
the cause, public tributes depicted fallen Canadian troops as happy 
warriors who had been “brave to the last, smiling to the end.”117 
Despite efforts to include Sharpe in this postwar mythology, the 
circumstances surrounding his death made for a complicated and 
unstable process of commemoration.
forgotten and remembered
In his message to Muriel, Sharpe had hoped, “After the war, 
we must have a memorial erected in memory of these brave men 
who have died that we might live.”118 On 27 June 1920, over one 
114  “Dead Dad’s Colonel, Wreath From Child,” Toronto Daily Star, 29 May 1918, 2.
115  Vance, Death So Noble, 7–8, 56.
116  Reprinted in “Letter by Col. Sharpe Held by Courts as Will,” Toronto Daily 
Star, 19 December 1919, 5.
117  House of Commons. Debates, 14th Parl., 3rd Sess. (3 March 1924), 49; Vance, 
Death So Noble, 109.
118  Sharpe to Hutchison, 21 October 1917.
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thousand citizens gathered in Uxbridge to pay tribute to “Ontario 
county’s gallant heroes.”119 In the local Methodist Church, former 
Ontario Premier William Howard Hearst and Mabel Sharpe unveiled 
a memorial tablet for her late husband. In the religious setting amidst 
patriotic celebrations of valour and heroism, no one differentiated 
Sharpe’s death from his men in the 116th who had died in France on 
“the field of honour.” The notion that a respected parliamentarian, a 
courageous colonel and a recipient of the Distinguished Service Order 
had succumbed to nervous collapse due to hereditary weakness or 
innate cowardice would have destabilised the mythology of heroic 
soldiers as well as threatened traditional masculine values. Medical 
and social reassessment of shell shock and neurasthenia offered the 
public an understandable explanation for how a brave soldier who had 
demonstrated daring on the battlefield could suffer mental damage 
culminating in suicide.
Yet an interpretation of shell shock that sought to preserve a 
prewar moral code and include Sharpe as a wartime casualty also 
excluded others deemed to have failed in adhering to prescribed 
masculine behaviour. Medical theories which separated “real cases” 
from supposed malingerers reinforced a belief that most breakdowns 
could be attributed to defects within an individual’s character. 
By contrast, commentators during the war and immediately after 
perceived Sharpe as a genuine example of war trauma because 
his breakdown seemed to follow the cultural expectation of stoic 
masculinity premised on willpower and strong character. As a result, 
for a moment after the war, Sharpe’s death could be interpreted 
to reinforce rather than weaken faith in the necessary sacrifice and 
moral justifications of the conflict. 
However, as the collective Canadian memory of the war 
coalesced, public awareness of Sharpe and shell shocked veterans 
became obscured if not forgotten by a desire to highlight redemption 
and salvation over tragedy, mental damage, and self-destruction.120 
While the 1918 Globe eulogy described Sharpe’s death “as if he had 
fallen in action,” the words “as if” acknowledged his death had not 
truly occurred in battle and thereby implied a continued distinction 
119  “Col. Sharpe Honored by Ontario County,” Toronto Daily Star, 28 June 1920, 3.
120  Vance Death So Noble, 36; Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War 
Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2006), 52–76; Barham, Forgotten Lunatics, 368.
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with the war dead.121 By the mid-1920s, a notable silence fell over 
the death and even the existence of Sharpe. When Arthur Meighen 
declared at the 1924 dedication of the Harry Baker statue, “it has 
been the lot of Canada only once” for a parliamentarian to “die a 
patriot’s death,” he evidently had not thought to include Sharpe.122 
As later Canadians sought to justify the necessity and utility of the 
war, the lessons Sharpe’s experience seemed to provide were too 
complex and nuanced to exist comfortably within the popular myths 
described by Vance.123 Canadians instead preferred less problematic 
symbols and figures to venerate in order to discourage close scrutiny 
of the war’s contradictions that had resulted in an ardent war 
supporter and believer in a just cause dying by suicide.
In his 1919 tribute to Sharpe, Jack Currie stated, “I trust that 
a place will be found to erect some monument to his memory,” 
but the 116th commander would not be formally commemorated 
in the halls of Parliament for nearly a century.124 In 2016, Erin 
O’Toole, former Minister of Veterans’ Affairs and Conservative 
mp for Durham, unveiled a relief plaque of Sharpe’s likeness to be 
installed in Parliament. O’Toole, who represents much of Sharpe’s 
original riding, felt his predecessor’s “memory was essentially 
erased from history.”125 In the context of current efforts to de-
stigmatise operational stress injuries within the Canadian Armed 
Forces, O’Toole explains “We’re using him as a teaching aid to 
say that we’ve come a long way since Sam Sharpe’s time, but we 
have a long way to go.”126 With suicide deaths in the Canadian 
Armed Forces having surpassed mission deaths during the War in 
Afghanistan, this historical case study of Sharpe calls our attention 
to the persistent problem of balancing mental health awareness and 
121  [Lyon], “The Last Measure of Devotion,” 6.
122  House of Commons. Debates, 14th Parl., 3rd Sess. (3 March 1924), 49.
123  Vance, Death So Nobel, 266.
124  House of Commons. Debates, 13th Parl., 2nd Session, (17 March 1919), 549.
125  Port Perry artist Tyler Briley designed the bronze memorial relief bust of 
Sharpe’s portrait; Quoted in Steve Paikin, “The Canadian MP who won an election 
from the frontline,” Steve Paikin’s Blog (22 December 2015), available: http://tvo.
org/blog/current-affairs/the-canadian-mp-who-won-an-election-from-the-frontline, 
[accessed 23 December 2015].
126  House of Commons. Veterans Affairs Committee. 41st Parl., 2nd Session, (12 
May 2015). 
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suicide de-stigmatisation with commemoration and recognition.127 If 
remembrance of Sharpe eventually became too problematic for the 
popular memory of the First World War, how will future Canadians 
interpret the service and sacrifice of modern soldiers and veterans 
who died by suicide?
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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